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RELIABILITY, THAT SHOULD BE THE QUESTION: THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF USING UNCOUNSELED TRIBAL
COURT CONVICTIONS IN SUBSEQUENT FEDERAL
TRIALS AFTER ANT, CAVANAUGH, AND SHAVANAUX
Samuel D. Newton*
I. Introduction
It likely would come as a shock to most Americans that Native
Americans can be tried in tribal courts and sentenced to jail without the
benefit of court-appointed counsel. The "right to the presence of an
attorney" and that "one will be appointed" for a defendant if he cannot
afford one during police questioning is deeply ingrained in the American
psyche.' For that reason, it is readily assumed that the right to counsel
would extend to a trial within the United States regardless of whether it is
held in the Western District of Oklahoma or Indian Country. However,
longstanding Supreme Court jurisprudence has held the Bill of Rights and
the Constitution do not apply to Indian tribes like they do to the states.2
Therefore, under United States law, Indians do not have a right to a court-
appointed attorney in tribal courts where the possible sentence will not be
more than one year.3 A defendant on trial in tribal court only has the right to
4
an attorney at his or her own expense.
The lack of the right to appointed counsel may make sense when tribal
courts sentence Native Americans to tribal sentences, but a serious issue
arises when convictions or pleas (hereinafter referred to collectively as
"convictions") made in tribal courts, without the benefit of counsel, are
introduced in subsequent federal cases and used to support convictions
which carry significant prison terms under federal statutes.
* Second-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law. Many thanks to
Professor Liesa Richter whose guidance and feedback was essential to this paper. Thanks
also to Jane Perrine and Sue Tonnessen for their invaluable assistance as the deadline drew
near. Finally, I wish to thank my parents without whom nothing would be possible.
1. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
2. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55-57 (1978) (holding that the bill
of rights does not fully apply to tribes); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 383-84 (1896).
3. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(6), (b)-(c) (2006).
4. Id. § 1302(a)(6).
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This Note discusses the split between the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits on whether to allow uncounseled tribal court convictions to be used
in subsequent federal prosecutions or as predicate elements in federal cases.
Specifically, this Note focuses on the split between the Ninth Circuit, which
does not allow the use of tribal court convictions in subsequent federal trials
if those convictions would have violated the Sixth Amendment if originally
made in federal court,5 and the Eighth and Tenth Circuits, which allow the
use of tribal court convictions in subsequent federal trials because those
convictions are valid under the Indian Civil Rights Act and, thus, do not
and could not violate the Sixth Amendment.6
Part II provides background on the Sixth Amendment and how, if at all,
convictions obtained without counsel may be used in subsequent
proceedings, the relationship between the Bill of Rights and Native
Americans, the Indian Civil Rights Act, and the doctrine of comity. Part III
summarizes the relevant portions of United States v. Ant, United States v.
Cavanaugh, and United States v. Shavanaux. Part IV analyzes these cases
and suggests how courts might better approach the issue. This Note
concludes that the question is not whether the Sixth Amendment allows the
use of the uncounseled convictions simply because they are valid, but rather
the question is whether the convictions are reliable enough to pass through
our Sixth Amendment filter.
II. Background
Any analysis of the Sixth Amendment in relation to tribes must start with
an understanding of current Supreme Court jurisprudence as it relates to the
Sixth Amendment along with jurisprudence and law regarding tribal
sovereignty and the Indian Civil Rights Act. This section summarizes the
history of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in the United States, the
reason the Sixth Amendment is not applicable to the tribes, the Indian Civil
Rights Act, and the doctrine of comity.
A. The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
The Sixth Amendment states criminal defendants "have the [right to]
Assistance of Counsel for [their] defence." In 1963, the Supreme Court
5. United States v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389, 1396 (9th Cir. 1989).
6. United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 998 (10th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.
Ct. 1742 (2012); United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 593-94 (8th Cir. 2011), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1542 (2012).
7. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
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made the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applicable to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment in Gideon v. Wainwright! What the right to
counsel actually entailed was interpreted in different ways through the
following three decades, with the Court eventually settling on the
constitutional principle that a person may not be imprisoned without having
an attorney or validly waiving the right to counsel.9 Further, the Court
determined that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, which does not
result in imprisonment, is valid and may be used to enhance a subsequent
conviction.'o Underlying these constitutional principles, and important to
the cases at issue in this Note, are the concepts of the validity of convictions
and the reliability of uncounseled versus counseled convictions."
Therefore, this section will examine the constitutional principles articulated
by the Court regarding right to counsel and the permissible uses of
convictions obtained without counsel in subsequent proceedings.
1. No Criminal Defendant May Be Sentenced to Incarceration Unless
They Were Afforded the Protection of Counsel or Waived the Right
Gideon v. Wainwright is the landmark case for right to counsel. In
1963, Clarence Gideon was charged with breaking and entering a pool hall,
but his request for an attorney to represent him at trial was denied.13
Thereafter, Gideon was convicted and sentenced to five years in prison.14
Relying on earlier decisions in Powell v. Alabama'5 and Johnson v.
Zerbst,6 the Court held the right to the assistance of counsel was essential
to life and liberty. '7 Anchoring its holding was the fact that state and federal
governments spent large amounts of money on lawyers prosecuting
criminals, and those who are accused and can afford it similarly spent large
amounts of money on hiring lawyers who advocate for them in court.8
Thus, the Court reasoned, attorneys are essential to receiving a fair trial.'9
8. 372 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1963).
9. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 374 (1979) (establishing the state must afford a
defendant the right to counsel, not that the defendant must be represented).
10. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 748-49 (1994).
11. See Scott, 440 U.S. at 372-73; Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639 n.20 (1965).
12. See generally Gideon, 372 U.S. 335.
13. Id. at 336-37.
14. Id. at 337.
15. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
16. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
17. Id. at 342-43.
18. Id. at 344.
19. Id.
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Reason and reflection also demonstrated that having counsel is important in
criminal cases because one "cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is
provided." 2 0 For those reasons, the Court held the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel is obligatory upon the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.2'
Almost ten years later, in Argersinger v. Hamlin,2 the Court clarified its
ruling in Gideon v. Wainwright.23 Jon Argersinger was charged with
carrying a concealed weapon, a petty crime, and sentenced to ninety days in
jail.2 4 He was not represented by counsel at trial.25 The respondent argued
counsel should not have to be provided for offenses where the person was
incarcerated for less than six months, but the Court was not "convinced that
legal and constitutional questions involved in a case that actually leads to
imprisonment even for a brief period are any less complex than when a
person can be sent [to jail] for six months or more."26 The Court found
counsel was often a predicate to a fair trial and held "absent a knowing and
intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether
classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by
counsel at his trial."2 7
After Argersinger, there was still confusion as to how far the right to
counsel went. Did it attach to every case where a person could be sentenced
to imprisonment or only when a person was actually sentenced to
incarceration? In Scott v. Illinois, the Court held because imprisonment is
such a severe punishment, a defendant should not be sentenced to
incarceration unless he has been provided counsel.28 The Court reasoned:
Even were the matter res nova, we believe that the central
premise of Argersinger - that actual imprisonment is a penalty
different in kind from fines or the mere threat of
imprisonment - is eminently sound and warrants adoption of
actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional right
to appointment of counsel.29
20. Id.
21. Id at 344-45.
22. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
23. See generally id.
24. Id. at 26.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 30-31, 33.
27. Id. at 37.
28. 440 U.S. 367, 372-74 (1979).
29. Id. at 373.
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Therefore, currently in the United States, for a person to be sentenced to
a term of incarceration, he must be provided the right to counsel even if he
cannot afford an attorney. While the Court defined the right to counsel in
Scott, it later addressed how uncounseled convictions could be used in
subsequent trials, if at all (e.g., for impeachment purposes or as predicate
convictions for recidivist statutes).
2. Uncounseled Convictions That Result in Imprisonment Are Not
Reliable and Cannot Be Used in Subsequent Trials, but Convictions
Obtained Without Counsel That Do Not Result in Incarceration Are
Presumed Reliable and May Be Used in Subsequent Trials
In Gideon v. Wainwright, the Supreme Court "recognized a fundamental
fact that a layman, no matter how intelligent, could not possibly further his
claims of innocence and violation of previously declared rights
adequately."30 Because an uncounseled defendant could not do so, the
Court determined judgments obtained without counsel "lacked
reliability."" Although the Court determined convictions obtained without
counsel were unreliable, the Court struggled over the next thirty years to
determine whether uncounseled convictions could be used in subsequent
trials. The Court eventually decided valid uncounseled decisions (i.e., those
which did not result in incarceration) were sufficiently reliable and could be
used in subsequent proceedings, but invalid uncounseled convictions could
not be used for any purpose.32
The Court first confronted the use of uncounseled convictions in Burgett
v. Texas, where a Tennessee state felony conviction was entered into
evidence during trial in Texas state court even though the Tennessee
convictions did not show the defendant was provided counsel or had
waived the right during the earlier trials. The Court held "[t]o permit a
conviction obtained in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright to be used against
[the defendant] either to support guilt or enhance punishment for another
offense is to erode the principle of [Gideon]."34 Furthermore, since Burgett
was denied the right to assistance of counsel, to use those earlier
convictions again would "in effect [mean he] suffer[ed] anew from the
30. Linkletterv. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639 n.20 (1965).
31. Id.
32. See Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 746-47 (1994); Burgett v. Texas, 389
U.S. 109, 115 (1967).
33. Burgett, 389 U.S. at 112-13.
34. Id. at 115 (citation omitted).
No. 2] 493
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deprivation of that Sixth Amendment right."35 Thus, earlier felony
convictions obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment cannot be used in
subsequent trials to enhance the penalty under recidivist statutes.
A few years later in United States v. Tucker,36 the Court held that the use
of uncounseled felony convictions during sentencing by a judge would
erode the principles of Gideon as well, and the only way to remedy the
erosion would be to remand the case to the district court for re-sentencing.3 7
In the next term the Court went even further, ruling previous uncounseled
felony convictions may not be used to impeach the defendant-witness
during cross-examination because the use of those convictions would
violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights "anew."3 8
Although it appeared the Court was headed toward disallowing the use
of uncounseled convictions in subsequent trials for all purposes, in Lewis v.
United States, the Court muddied the waters when it explained it had "never
suggested that an uncounseled conviction is invalid for all purposes." 3 9 At
issue in Lewis was a federal firearms statute that prohibited a convicted
felon from having a firearm in his possession.4 0 Lewis, a convicted felon,
was found to be in unlawful possession of a firearm and at trial his prior
uncounseled convictions were allowed into the record.4 1 The Court
reasoned that Burgett, Tucker, and Loper had all focused on reliability as
the reason for their reversal of the lower courts. But in Lewis's case, the
firearms statute was not focused on reliability; its purpose was to keep the
firearms away from criminals.42 Thus, the Court allowed the use of the
uncounseled prior convictions. The Court, however, returned to its stance of
disallowing all uncounseled prior convictions in subsequent trials when it
decided Baldasar v. Illinois.43
Baldasar was a splintered per curiam decision about whether an
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, constitutionally valid because the
defendant was not incarcerated, could be used under an enhancement
statute to raise a subsequent misdemeanor to a felony, which carried a
35. Id
36. 404 U.S. 443 (1972).
37. Id at 449.
38. Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 483-84 (1972).
39. 445 U.S. 55, 66-67 (1980).
40. Id. at 57.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 67.
43. See generally 446 U.S. 222 (1980) (per curiam), overruled by Nichols v. United
States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994).
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prison term.4 Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens,
found the defendant was sentenced to prison only because of his prior
conviction, which Justice Stewart found violated the principles of Scott.4 5
Thus, Justice Stewart found an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction,
although it may be constitutionally valid because there was no
incarceration, could not be used to enhance a subsequent misdemeanor to a
felony.4 6
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens, also found the
defendant's conviction was invalid for all purposes, imprisonment being
one, because the earlier conviction, although constitutionally permissible,
was not reliable. Justice Marshall reasoned the prison sentence imposed
after the enhancement was imposed "as a direct consequence of [the]
uncounseled conviction and is therefore forbidden under Scott and
Argersinger."A
Although Justice Blackmon voted to overturn the conviction, he did not
join the opinions of the other justices in the plurality and argued instead for
a bright line rule. 49 He favored a rule whereby a defendant would be
required to have appointed counsel if prosecuted for an offense punishable
by more than six months in prison or when imprisonment is actually
imposed.50 Thus, the Court was left without a unified rationale for why the
earlier constitutionally valid uncounseled misdemeanor conviction could
not be used for sentence enhancement under a recidivist statute. Although
the plurality won the day in Baldasar, the dissent would later play a much
more important role in shaping this area of law.
Written by Justice Powell and joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justices White and Rhenquist, the dissent in Baldasar argued that the repeat
offender laws do not penalize the first crime but are only punishment for
the second crime . Furthermore, Justice Powell argued the approach
advocated by the plurality would confuse the courts because what was a
constitutional conviction would suddenly become unconstitutional if it were
used to enhance a penalty under a recidivist statute.52 While invalid felony
44. Id. at 222.
45. Id. at 224 (Stewart, J., concurring).
46. See id. at 224.
47. Id. at 226-27 (Marshall, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 227.
49. Id. at 229-30 (Blackmon, J., concurring).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 232 (Powell, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 231.
495No. 2]
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convictions could not be used to enhance a sentence, misdemeanors, the
dissent argued, were usable.53 Furthermore, in Baldasar's case, "the
uncounseled conviction [was] conceded to be valid and thus must be
presumed reliable."S4
Fourteen years later, recognizing the Baldasar decision caused confusion
among the circuits, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in
Nichols v. United States, held an "uncounseled conviction valid under Scott
may be relied upon to enhance the sentence for a subsequent offense, even
though that sentence entails imprisonment."55 Nichols was convicted in
federal court of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and, under the United
States Sentencing Guidelines, had his sentence increased by one point for a
prior uncounseled DUI conviction.6 That one point increased his sentence
by twenty-five months. Thus, the Court was confronted, again, with
whether the Constitution prohibits a court from considering a defendant's
previous uncounseled misdemeanor conviction in sentencing him for a
subsequent offense.58 The Court decided to adhere to Scott, and if the
original uncounseled conviction did not result in actual imprisonment, then
there was no violation of the Sixth Amendment.
Relying on the dissent in Baldasar, the Court found that use of an earlier
conviction in a subsequent trial does not change the penalty imposed for
that earlier conviction.60 Thus, it was logical that a conviction valid at its
inception could also be used to support enhancement.61 The Court also
stated that use of the uncounseled misdemeanor conviction was consistent
with the less rigorous standards employed during a sentencing hearing to
determine the sentence.6 2 As such, the Court overruled its earlier decision in
Baldasar, and today it is constitutionally permissible to use uncounseled
misdemeanor convictions in determining sentence enhancements, either
through the sentencing guidelines or as part of recidivist statutes.63
The circuit courts of appeals have applied a broader reading of Nichols.
For example, in United States v. Lonjose, the Tenth Circuit was confronted
53. Id. at 233.
54. Id. at 233 n.2.
55. 511 U.S. 738, 746-47 (1994).
56. Id. at 740-41.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 740.
59. Id. at 746.
60. Id. at 747.
61. Id. at 746-47.
62. Id. at 747-48.
63. Id. at 748.
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with an issue similar to those presented in the cases that are the subject of
this Note.64 Lonjose was charged under a federal statute for child abuse, and
his prior uncounseled tribal court convictions, some of which resulted in
incarceration, were used as "permissible departure factors" to enhance his
sentence under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.65 The Tenth Circuit
allowed the use of the uncounseled convictions because they concluded that
the Supreme Court's decision in Nichols permitted the use of prior
convictions for all purposes if those prior convictions were valid at their
inception.66 The Tenth Circuit cited opinions holding the same from the
Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits stating, "it appears that only the
Ninth Circuit continues to question the use of initially valid uncounseled
,,67
convictions to enhance subsequent federal sentences ....
While the Court's decision in Nichols appeared to end the debate over
the use of valid, uncounseled convictions in subsequent proceedings, the
Court is still defining the limits of the right to counsel. In Alabama v.
Shelton, the Court recently held a suspended sentence, which "may 'end up
in the actual deprivation of a person's liberty' may not be imposed unless
the defendant was accorded the 'guiding hand of counsel' in the
prosecution of the crime charged."6 8 The Court ruled a suspended sentence
was still a prison term and could not be imposed without counsel.69 The
Court rejected the respondent's argument that a probation hearing, which
would decide whether to activate the suspended sentence, was sufficient to
remove the taint of not having counsel because "it does not even address
the key Sixth Amendment inquiry: whether the adjudication of guilt
corresponding to the prison sentence is sufficiently reliable to permit
incarceration."o Thus, it would appear that the Court has again returned to
the concern with reliability of the conviction rather than a focus on
technical validity."
Today, a conviction and sentence of incarceration is invalid if a person is
not afforded the right to counsel, whether this is for a misdemeanor or
felony conviction. While an uncounseled felony can never be used in
64. See generally United States v. Lonjose, 42 F. App'x 177 (10th Cir. 2002).
65. Id. at 178-79, 181-82.
66. Id. at 181.
67. Id. at 182 (comparing Ninth Circuit cases concerning uncounseled convictions); see
also id. at 181-82.
68. 535 U.S. 654, 658 (2002) (quoting Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972)).
69. Id. at 662.
70. Id. at 667.
71. See United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 600-01 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 1542 (2012).
No. 2] 497
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subsequent prosecutions,n an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction is valid
and may be used in a subsequent prosecution.73 In Indian tribal courts,
however, because of the unique history and characteristics of the tribal
system, the right to counsel does not apply the same way it does in federal
and state courts.
B. Inapplicability of the Bill ofRights to the Indian Tribes
In Worcester v. Georgia,74 an opinion dealing with the right of the state
of Georgia to regulate those who could reside inside the boundaries of the
Cherokee Nation, Chief Justice John Marshall recognized that Indian tribes
were distinct from the United States: "[t]he Indian nations ha[ve] always
been considered as distinct, independent, political communities, retaining
their original natural rights. . . . The very term 'nation,' so generally applied
to them, means 'a people distinct from others."' 7 Further, in United States
v. Kagama," the Court reaffirmed this principle when they wrote Indians
are "a separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and social
relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of the Union, or of the
state within whose limits they resided."7 7
In Talton v. Mayes the Court held that although the tribes are "subject to
the supreme legislative authority of the United States," the Constitution
does not apply to them in Indian Country in the same way it does to the
federal or state governments. 8 The principle that Indian tribes are distinct,
and therefore neither the Constitution nor the Bill of Rights is applicable to
the tribes, has been affirmed time and time again.79 "The powers of self-
government which an Indian tribe may possess and exercise are inherent,
therefore, in the sovereign character of the tribe not derived by grant or
cession from Congress or the States." 80 In the late 1960s, however,
72. Id. at 598.
73. See Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 748-49 (1994).
74. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
75. Id. at 559.
76. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
77. Id. at 381.
78. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896).
79. See, e.g., Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316,
337 (2008); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55-56 (1978).
80. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIoNAL RIGHTS OF THE S. COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN 1 (Comm. Print
1966).
498 [Vol. 36
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol36/iss2/7
NOTES
Congress extended many rights contained in the Bill of Rights to the tribes
through federal legislation.81
C. The Indian Civil Rights Act
Enacted in the 1960s, an era marked by the concern for civil rights of
minorities,8 2 the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA)83 was passed as "a means
to 'grant the American Indians the rights which are secured to other
Americans."' 84 The ICRA was championed by Senator Sam Ervin of North
Carolina who "concluded that the rights of Indians were 'seriously
jeopardized by the tribal government's administration of justice,"' which
was a result of the 'tribal judges' inexperience, lack of training, and
unfamiliarity with the traditions and forms of the American legal
system.'s 85
Native Americans objected to the passage of the ICRA because "tribal
traditions of fairness and justice made the ICRA an unnecessary intrusion
on tribal sovereignty."86 Those Indians who opposed the ICRA believed the
bill would amount to an "imposition of foreign principles of government
and limitations on their sovereign power."87 The use of a court system to
solve disputes was a foreign idea to Indians who traditionally viewed "law
and justice as personal and clan affairs."
Thus, although the original ICRA, as put forth by Senator Ervin,
extended exactly the same protections to the tribes as the Bill of Rights did
to the rest of the nation, the version which was eventually passed was a
compromise between the preservation of tribal sovereignty (i.e., protection
of custom and tradition) and Senator Ervin's desire to extend the Bill of
Rights to the tribes.89 The major differences between the final version of the
81. Id. at 5.
82. JusTIN B. RICHLAND & SARAH DEER, INTRODUCTION TO TRIBAL LEGAL STUDIES 247
(2004).
83. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (2006). The ICRA is also referred to as the Indian Bill of
Rights. Robert J. McCarthy, Civil Rights in Tribal Courts: The Indian Bill ofRights at Thirty
Years, 34 IDAHO L. REv. 465, 470 (1998).
84. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 101 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds.,
LexisNexis 2005).
85. McCarthy, supra note 77, at 469.
86. Id. at 470.
87. Richland & Deer, supra note 76, at 237.
88. McCarthy, supra note 77, at 483.
89. See Barbara Creel, Tribal Court Convictions and the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: Respect for Tribal Courts and Tribal People in Federal Sentencing, 46 U.S.F. L.
REv. 37, 65 (2011).
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ICRA and the Bill of Rights are those relating to the establishment of
religion, grand juries and indictments, and the right to appointed counsel. 90
The ICRA extends to Indians charged in tribal courts the right to
counsel, but only at his or her own expense.91 If the defendant cannot afford
an attorney, the tribes do not have to supply an attorney.92 In promulgating
the bill, Congress deliberately chose not to extend a right to appointed
counsel because there were no attorneys present in tribal areas, leaving the
court no attorneys to appoint as counsel.9 3 Furthermore, Indian tribes did
not have "adequate resources" to provide counsel for indigent defendants.94
Approximately a decade after the passage of the ICRA, the Ninth Circuit,
in Tom v. Sutton, was confronted with whether the defendant, a member of
the Lumni Tribe, had the right to appointment of counsel in his tribal court
proceeding.95 The court examined the ICRA and found the right to
appointment of counsel had specifically been omitted from the bill because
of the lack of a bar from which to appoint attorneys in Indian Country.
Furthermore, when the Lumni adopted the ICRA as their constitution, the
tribe also did not extend the right of appointment of counsel to indigent
defendants.97 Thus, the court held the defendant did not have the right to the
assistance of appointed counsel in tribal court.
Despite the fact that the ICRA as passed did not include any requirement
to appoint counsel, in 2010, Congress passed the Tribal Law and Order Act,
which allows tribal courts to impose sentences of up to three years. 99 In
order to impose a prison term of more than one year, the Act said tribes
must provide defendants with "effective assistance of counsel at least equal
to that guaranteed by the United States Constitution." 00 Below the one-year
90. See McCarthy, supra note 76, at 471.
91. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(6) (2006).
92. Id.
93. Tom v. Sutton, 533 F.2d 1101, 1104 (9th Cir. 1976) (quoting To Protect
Constitutional Rights ofAmerican Indians: Hearing on S. 961, S. 962, S. 963, S. 964, S. 965,
S. 965, S. 967, S. 968, and S.J. Res. 40 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights. of the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. (1965)).
94. John R. Wunder, The Indian Bill of Rights, in NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE LAW:
THE INDIAN BILL OF RIGHTS, 1968, at 16 (John R. Wunder ed., 1996).
95. Sutton, 533 F.2d at 1102.
96. Id. at 1104.
97. Id. at 1105-06.
98. ld. at 1106.
99. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(b) (Supp. IV 2010); United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592,
596 n.2 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1542 (2012).
100. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c)(1).
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threshold, a tribal member may be sentenced to jail in a tribal court
proceeding where he did not have assistance of counsel.'0o Today a tribal
member may be tried in tribal court in Indian Country and sentenced to up
to one year of imprisonment without the assistance of counsel. In order to
hand down a sentence of greater than one year, the defendant must either
have counsel present or have waived the right. Since the tribes are distinct,
independent communities, in order for judgments or convictions entered in
tribal courts to be enforced outside tribal jurisdiction, the United States'
courts must extend comity to those decisions.
D. Comity
In Hilton v. Guyotl02 the Supreme Court determined comity "is neither a
matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and
good will upon the other."'o3 Rather, it is a balancing act between
recognizing the legislative, executive and judicial acts of other nations and
the rights of citizens of the recognizing countries.' 04 Comity, in relation to
the Indian tribes, has chiefly been concerned with ensuring tribal court
remedies are exhausted before federal courts become involved. 05
Furthermore, it is proper to use principles of comity to decide whether to
recognize and enforce tribal court judgments because tribes are considered
separate political entities.106 Federal courts have stated "comity should be
withheld only when its acceptance would be contrary or prejudicial to the
interest of the nation called upon to give it effect,"' 07 and federal courts
should respect the "special customs and practical limitations" of tribal
courts. 08
Generally, courts recognize the judgments of foreign courts so long as
(1) those judgments are rendered by impartial tribunals and do not violate
due process and (2) the rendering court had the proper jurisdiction over the
person, according to the foreign state's laws.' 09 According to the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations, evidence a person was "unable to
101. See generally Sutton, 533 F.2d 1101.
102. 159U.S. 113(1895).
103. Id. at 163-64.
104. See id. at 164.
105. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 19 (1987); Nat'1 Farmers Union Ins.
Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 857 (1985).
106. Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 1997).
107. Somportex Ltd. v. Phila. Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971).
108. Wilson, 127 F.3d at 811.
109. RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 482 (1987).
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obtain counsel . . . would support a conclusion that the legal system was
one whose judgments are not entitled to recognition.""1 0
Foreign judgments will generally only be overturned if they were not a
product of "civilized jurisprudence,".' but there is a public policy
exception to comity. It is a "well-recognized danger" the public policy
exception could be overused and thus "'swallow the whole rule of comity'
especially in a tribal setting."' 1 2 The "danger" of the overused public policy
exception relates to different cultures and how a country is less apt to give
recognition to a foreign judgment where the process used to arrive at the
judgment is not similar to their own. 1 13
Accordingly, while comity allows a court to recognize a foreign
judgment, it does not compel the recognition.' 14 However, courts have
repeatedly recognized the power of Indian tribes to punish tribal members
for violations of tribal law and have not been inclined to interfere with that
power. 15
Generally, tribal convictions imposing less than a one-year sentence and
obtained without counsel do not pose a threat of being overturned because
tribal members are not guaranteed counsel in those instances, according to
the ICRA and the Tribal Law and Order Act."'6 If the same cases were to
be tried in federal or state court, however, those defendants would have a
right to counsel for any sentence of incarceration.1 17 Therefore, the question
is whether the subsequent use of an uncounseled tribal court conviction to
support a federal crime is constitutionally appropriate.
Of the three circuit courts of appeals that addressed the issue, only one,
the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Ant, has found it a violation of the
Sixth Amendment." 8 The Eighth Circuit in United States v. Cavanaugh,
and the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Shavanaux found there was no
110. Id. § 482 cmt. b.
111. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 205-06 (1895).
112. Lindsay Louden Vest, Comment, Cross-Border Judgments and the Public Policy
Exception: Solving the Foreign Judgment Quandary by Way of Tribal Courts, 153 U. PA. L.
REV. 797, 804 (2004).
113. Seeid. at 800-01.
114. Id. at 804.
115. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 325 (1978), superseded by statute, 25
U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006), as recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
116. See Tom v. Sutton, 533 F.2d 1101, 1102 (9th Cir. 1976).
117. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979).
118. United States v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389, 1396 (9th Cir. 1989).
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Sixth Amendment violation.119 The next section of this Note will more
closely examine the approaches taken by the three circuits in deciding
whether to allow uncounseled tribal court convictions or pleas in
subsequent federal trials.
III. Principal Cases at Issue
A. United States v. Ant: Convictions Which Would Not Be Valid if
Originally Entered in United States Courts Cannot Then Be Used in a
Subsequent Federal Case
In October of 1986 the body of Francis Ant's niece was found on the
Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation.12 0 After obtaining a confession
without Miranda warnings, tribal police arrested Ant for Assault and
Battery.121 Ant was arraigned in tribal court,12 2 where the judge advised him
he had a right to a court-appointed attorney, but the judge never asked if
Ant had or wanted an attorney. - Instead, according to Ant, the judge
proceeded to ask Ant to enter a plea of guilty or not guilty.12 4 Ant pled
guilty and was sentenced to six months in jail.125
Less than a month after his guilty plea, Ant was indicted in federal court
on charges of voluntary manslaughter under the Indian Major Crimes
Act.12 6 During his federal trial, where he was furnished with counsel, Ant
moved to suppress his earlier confession to tribal police because it was
obtained in violation of Miranda and to suppress the guilty plea because it
was obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment.127 The district court
suppressed the confession, but found the tribal court arraignment was
119. United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 998 (10th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.
Ct. 1742 (2012); United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 605 (8th Cir. 2011), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1542 (2012).
120. Ant, 882 F.2d at 1390.
121. Id.
122. Id. Ant asserted that the judge went straight from reading him his right to asking
him to enter a plea. It was the judge's practice to inform defendants about their right to
counsel, including appointed counsel, but not to ask about whether they could actually afford
counsel. Id. at 1390-91.
123. Id. at 1391.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. The Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006), provides the federal
government with exclusive jurisdiction over major crimes that are committed against Indians
or others within the bounds of Indian Country including: murders, assaults resulting in
serious bodily injury, kidnappings, and other similar serious crimes.
127. Ant, 882 F.2d at 1391.
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consistent with both tribal law and the ICRA.128 The district judge ruled that
comity and respect for legitimate tribal proceedings required him to deny
the motion to suppress the guilty plea. 12 9 Ant was convicted and sentenced
to three years in prison and a $50 fine.13 0
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the court did not agree with the district
judge that comity and respect for tribal proceedings were sufficient reasons
to allow the guilty plea. As the Ninth Circuit saw it, the issue was "whether
an uncounseled guilty plea, made in tribal court in accordance both with
tribal law and the ICRA, but which would have been unconstitutional if
made in a federal court, can be admitted as evidence of guilt in a
subsequent federal prosecution involving the same criminal acts.""'3 In
examining the issue, the court looked at the following: first, whether Ant's
guilty plea was valid under tribal law and the ICRA; second, whether the
guilty plea could even be used as evidence in a subsequent prosecution; and
third, whether Ant's plea, if made in federal court originally, would have
been constitutionally permissible.'32
1. Validity ofAnt's Conviction in Tribal Court and Under the ICRA
In determining whether the conviction was valid in tribal court and under
the ICRA, the Ninth Circuit relied on the text of the ICRA and its previous
holding in Tom v. Sutton. ' The court recognized the ICRA only provides
for the right to counsel at the defendant's own expense.13 4 The court also
acknowledged that even though there was confusion about exactly what
was said during the arraignment in tribal court, the district court's decision
was not "clearly erroneous," and because "[fjederal courts must avoid
undue or intrusive interference in reviewing Tribal Court procedures," the
district court's determination that the guilty plea was valid under tribal law
and the ICRA would stand.'3 1 With the validity question decided, the court
turned to the question of whether an earlier guilty plea could be used in a
subsequent federal prosecution.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1392.
134. Id.
135. Id. (quoting Smith v. Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs Reservation, 783 F.2d
1409, 1412 (9th Cir. 1986)).
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2. Using an Earlier Guilty Plea in Subsequent Federal Prosecution
The Ninth Circuit determined if an earlier guilty plea had no
constitutional infirmities, the plea could be used in subsequent trials if the
plea was "made under conditions consistent with the United States
Constitution."13 The court did note that although the admission in Riley
was allowed, there "were no claims that the earlier guilty plea was in any
way invalid." 137
The Ninth Circuit found it was another matter entirely when the plea was
obtained in violation of the Constitution. The court found when a plea was
obtained in violation of the Constitution, it could not be used in a
subsequent federal prosecution.13 8 The Ninth Circuit also noted that Ant
was not advised during his tribal court proceeding that it was possible for
his plea and conviction to be used against him in federal court.19 Thus, the
court established its baseline that an earlier guilty plea could be used in a
subsequent trial, but not if the plea had constitutional infirmities.140
3. What IfAnt's Guilty Plea Had Been Made in Federal Court?
In determining whether Ant's plea from tribal court could be used in the
subsequent federal manslaughter case, the Ninth Circuit found the right to
counsel attaches at "critical stages."' 4 1 Therefore, since Ant was sentenced
immediately after his arraignment and guilty plea, the arraignment was the
''critical stage," and Ant was entitled to counsel under the Sixth
Amendment.14 2 The Court held if Ant's plea had been made in federal
court, it would have not only been "constitutionally infirm, but . . . also
[would have been] inadmissible in a subsequent federal prosecution."l 43
In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's
decision in Argersinger v. Hamlin, which found if a defendant was not
represented by counsel at trial he could not be imprisoned.'" Additionally,
136. Id. (citing United States v. Riley, 682 F.2d 542 (8th Cir. 1982)).
137. Id. at 1393.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1393-94 (citing Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967); Hamilton v. Alabama,
368 U.S. 52 (1961)).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1393.
144. Id. at 1394 (citing Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972)).
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the Ninth Circuit relied upon the Supreme Court's holding in Baldasar v.
Illinois that uncounseled misdemeanor convictions could not be used to
enhance a subsequent misdemeanor into a felony with prison time.145
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit reasoned the only way Ant's plea could be
admitted in a subsequent trial in federal court would be if Ant had waived
his right to counsel. 14 6
The burden to show waiver falls on the government and the
government's argument, that Ant acknowledged his rights and failed to
request an attorney in tribal court, was not persuasive. 147 In rejecting the
government's argument, the court stated Ant was neither given the
opportunity for appointed counsel nor was he aware his tribal court plea
could be used against him in a subsequent federal trial. 148
4. Was Ant's Tribal Court Plea Properly Admitted in the Subsequent
Federal Trial?
Because Ant's tribal plea would not have been admissible if originally
made in federal court, the Ninth Circuit held it was improper for it to be
used in a subsequent federal trial.149 The court noted the district court's
reasons for allowing the plea, but dismissed them each in turn. First, the
Court labeled the district court's concern about comity "novel," and
emphasized that comity was previously used to "prevent direct attack on
tribal proceedings in federal courts, and to require exhaustion of tribal
remedies before going to federal court."150 The Ninth Circuit distinguished
Ant's federal prosecution and found that the decision of whether to allow
tribal convictions in federal court does not constitute a direct attack on
tribal court proceedings, and comity is not at issue.151 Second, the district
judge's concern that the suppression of the guilty plea would "disparage the
tribal proceedings" was likewise without foundation. 152  Here, the Ninth
Circuit explained, the ruling is not about the validity of the tribal court
conviction, but rather about whether the guilty plea meets federal
145. Id. (citing Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980) (per curiam), overruled by
Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994)).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1395.
150. Id. at 1396 (citing Nat'1 Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S.
845 (1985)).
151. Id.
152. Id.
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standards.15 3 In this case, the court only examined the tribal court
proceedings, determined they were not in compliance with the necessary
protections for federal prosecutions, and refused to allow the guilty plea.15 4
Therefore, because the tribal court guilty plea was made under
circumstances that would have violated the Constitution if it was applicable
to the tribal proceedings, and because suppression would not violate
comity, disparage the tribal court, or prejudice the government, the plea
should have been suppressed. 55 The district judge's decision not to
suppress the guilty plea and the federal manslaughter conviction were
reversed.156
5. Dissent ofJudge O'Scannlain
Judge O'Scannlain agreed with the district judge that the suppression of
the plea entered in tribal court would "disparage the integrity of the tribal
courts."' Judge O'Scannlain admits if the plea had originally been filed in
federal or state court, then suppression of the plea would be proper; but he
took exception with the majority because those were not the facts before the
court.5
Instead, he relied upon the fact that tribal courts are entitled to the same
"dignity shown to foreign courts" and foreign convictions are generally
admissible in federal court.' 59 Judge O'Scannlain, relying on Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, found Ant's plea would not have been
admissible if it was coerced, shocking, not valid in the jurisdiction where it
was secured, or if the jurisdiction handing down the conviction was not as
equally civilized as the United States. 60 Thus, he argued the majority was
not honoring the plea because the majority did not feel the tribal court
system was as civilized as the federal system.' 6 ' Furthermore, Congress was
more properly suited than the court to determine whether or not to apply the
Sixth Amendment right to the tribes, and Congress had already determined
the right did not apply in the same way.162
153. Id
154. Id.
155. Id
156. Id. at 1390.
157. See id at 1396 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1396-97.
160. See id. at 1397.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1398.
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Notwithstanding the dissent, the Ninth Circuit held Ant's guilty plea and
conviction were not admissible in federal court because, if originally made
in federal court, it would have violated the Sixth Amendment, and
suppression of the plea on those grounds would not violate the principles of
comity or disparage tribal courts.163 The following case views the use of
uncounseled tribal convictions in a subsequent federal case in a different
light.
B. United States v. Cavanaugh: Technical Validity ofa Conviction
Determines Whether It May Be Used in a Subsequent Trial
The next circuit court to engage the issue of uncounseled tribal court
convictions was the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Cavanaugh.16 4
Although the Eighth Circuit was also examining the use of uncounseled
tribal court decisions in a subsequent trial, in Cavanaugh's case, the
convictions were being used as predicate elements to meet the requirements
of a habitual offender under 18 U.S.C. § 117.165
Cavanaugh had been driving drunk with his common-law wife and child
when he and his wife started to fight. 166 In the midst of the fight,
Cavanaugh violently jerked his wife's head back and forth eventually
slamming her head into the car's dashboard.16 7 Since he had three prior
tribal court convictions for misdemeanor domestic assault, Cavanaugh was
charged under the federal statute.168 At trial, he informed the district judge
he had not had the assistance of counsel in any of his three prior convictions
and although he had been informed of his right to have counsel, he was
financially unable to hire counsel.169 Each of his prior convictions resulted
in jail time, and thus, if he had been charged in federal or state court, he
would have been entitled to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.170
In reaching its decision of whether to allow the prior convictions in tribal
court to provide the predicate convictions required under federal statute, the
163. Id. at 1396.
164. 643 F.3d 592 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1542 (2012).
165. 18 U.S.C. § 117 (2006); Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 593. Under the habitual offender
statute, anyone in Indian Country who commits a domestic assault and has at least two prior
convictions for assault, sexual abuse, or a serious violent felony against their spouse or
intimate partner in either federal, state, or Indian tribal court can be tried in federal court. 18
U.S.C. § 117.
166. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 594.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 593.
169. See id. at 594.
170. See id at 593.
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district court recognized failure to provide counsel in tribal court was not a
violation of the Sixth Amendment.17' However, the district judge ruled that
the prior "uncounseled convictions were infirm for the purpose of proving
the habitual-offender, predicate-conviction elements of the . . . offense in
[the] subsequent federal court proceedings."' 72 The district judge relied, in
part, on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Ant. 73 The government appealed the
district judge's decision to the Eighth Circuit. ' 4
The issue before the Eighth Circuit was whether the use of Cavanaugh's
tribal court convictions in a federal trial violated the Sixth Amendment. The
court addressed the question in two parts. First, the Eighth Circuit examined
whether the convictions, if originally entered in state or federal court,
would have been usable as predicate elements for the habitual offender
statute.17 5 Second, the court examined whether - assuming the convictions
were infirm and could not be used as predicate offenses for the habitual
offender statute if originally entered in state or federal court - "otherwise
valid tribal court conviction[s] should be treated as infirm for such purposes
even though [they] technically [were] not unconstitutional." '76
1. Use of Uncounseled Federal or State Convictions as Predicate
Elements
In a much deeper analysis than the one conducted by the Ant court, and
with the benefit of twenty-plus years of Supreme Court jurisprudence, the
Eighth Circuit began its analysis using the baselines of Gideon and Scott:
appointing counsel is not required unless there is actual incarceration.'77
The Eighth Circuit found that prior to Scott, in United States v. Tucker
and Burgett v. Texas, the Supreme Court had held prior uncounseled felony
convictions could not be used to enhance sentences; and in Loper v. Beto,
the Supreme Court had held prior uncounseled felony convictions could not
be used for purposes of impeachment.178 Therefore, the Eighth Circuit
explained that Tucker, Burgett, and Loper "seem to have reflected a general
belief that it was necessary to prevent erosion of the 'principle' of Gideon
171. Id at 594.
172. Id.
173. United States v. Cavanaugh (Cavanaugh if), 680 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1075-76
(D.N.D. 2009), rev'd, 643 F.3d 592 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1542 (2012).
174. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 594.
175. Id at 596.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 597.
178. Id. at 598 (citing Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967); United States v.
Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 444 (1972); Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 484 (1972)).
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and that the earlier deprivation of counsel, essentially, flowed through to
the subsequent proceeding . . . ."'9 While the Eighth Circuit noted the
holdings of Tucker, Burgett, and Loper, it based its decision mostly on
Nichols.!so
Before discussing Nichols in depth, the court admitted that if Nichols had
not overturned Baldasar, Cavanaugh's argument would have been much
stronger. The Eighth Circuit noted, however, the Nichols rationale - that
use of the earlier conviction does not change the penalty for that conviction,
only the current conviction - was not easily, if at all, squared with the
ideas gleaned from the pre-Baldasar/Scott holdings that the Sixth
Amendment violation flowed through to the subsequent case.182
Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit found that Nichols seemed to reject the
reliability concern, which undergirded the holding in Gideon.183 The Eighth
Circuit also believed the Supreme Court's decision in Alabama v. Sheltonl84
further complicated the prior-conviction-use landscape by ostensibly
bringing back the reliability concem.185
The court reasoned "regardless of whether reliability-based concerns
exist, it is the fact of a constitutional violation that triggers a limitation on
using a prior conviction in subsequent proceedings."' 8 6 The Eighth Circuit
continued, saying "[i]t is arguable that the fact of an actual constitutional
violation is, perhaps, not only an important factor for determining when a
prior conviction may be used for sentence enhancement purposes, but a
required or controlling, factor." 87 Before concluding this section, however,
the Eighth Circuit analyzed two other Supreme Court decisions it thought
could not easily be reconciled with the existing Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence, or each other for that matter. 88
The Eighth Circuit noted the holding in United States v. Lewis,18 9 where
the Supreme Court was not concerned about the reliability of the earlier
conviction because the purpose of the statute was to prevent convicted
179. Id.
180. Id. at 603-04.
181. Id at 599.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 600.
184. 535 U.S. 654 (2002).
185. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 600-01.
186. Id. at 601.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 602-03.
189. 445 U.S. 55 (1980).
[Vol. 36510
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol36/iss2/7
NOTES
felons from having guns.190 The second case the Eighth Circuit cited in this
section was United States v. Mendoza-Lopez,191 and the court found a broad
reading of the decision lent credence to the fact that "certain constitutional
infirmities in underlying proceedings make use of the judgment from such a
proceeding infirm for the purpose of proving an element of a subsequent
criminal charge." 92 Ultimately, the Eighth Circuit concluded the cases "fail
to provide clear direction" as to whether uncounseled convictions can be
used.193 The only thing that is clear from the Eighth Circuit's analysis on
the use of infirm prior convictions is that this area of law is unclear.
2. Should Uncounseled Tribal Convictions Be Allowed in Subsequent
Federal Trials?
The Eighth Circuit admitted, based on the decisions of the Supreme
Court, that the use of uncounseled prior convictions is debatable, but in any
event, the ultimate question in the case "[was] whether an uncounseled
conviction resulting in a tribal incarceration that involved no actual
constitutional violation may be used later in federal court." 94 The court
noted "none of the previously discussed cases precluded the use of a prior
conviction for any purpose in the absence of an actual violation of the
United States Constitution."l 95 Correspondingly, following Nichols, the
Eighth Circuit concluded that Cavanaugh's conviction was not
unconstitutional because the Sixth Amendment does not apply to Indians,
and that this fact should be given the greatest weight in deciding the case.196
190. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 602 (citing Lewis, 445 U.S. at 67).
191. 481 U.S. 828 (1987).
192. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 603 (citing Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828). Mendoza-Lopez
disallowed the use of a deportation hearing in a subsequent criminal case because the
defendants were not only "deprived of their rights to appeal," but also "any basis to appeal"
because their ability to appeal was not "adequately explained to them." Mendoza-Lopez, 481
U.S. at 842. The Eighth Circuit believed a broad reading would support the argument not to
allow uncounseled tribal court convictions in subsequent trials, but Mendoza-Lopez did not
appear to be concerned with the right to counsel; instead, it focused on how the deportation
hearings violated due process because there was no right to a collateral review, an issue not
presented by the cases under examination. Id. at 839-40. Thus, this case was not mentioned
in the background nor will it be examined further. It is included, however, in order to
provide the reader with the complete picture of the Eighth Circuit's reasoning.
193. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 603.
194. Id. (footnote omitted).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 603-04 ("As per Nichols, then, we believe it is necessary to accord substantial
weight to the fact that Cavanaugh's prior convictions involved no actual constitutional
violation.").
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The court conceded it was not giving any "special weight to the unique
reason for why there was no constitutional violation" in the earlier
proceedings.' 9 7 In other words, the court did not attach importance to the
fact that the earlier convictions were in tribal courts, where the right to
counsel did not exist. Yet, the court still felt the "technical validity of a
conviction was a more important factor than the Gideon-type reliability
concerns that always arise when counsel is absent."'
Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit distinguished Cavanaugh from Ant. In
Ant the government attempted to use the guilty plea to prove the same
offense, whereas in the Cavanaugh case, the prior convictions were used as
the predicates for the federal charge.' 99 The Eighth Circuit dismissed the
defendant's argument, that the convictions were invalid from the outset,
because no counsel was provided. The court noted that the prior convictions
were in tribal court where there is no Sixth Amendment right to appointed
counsel. 20 0 Thus, the Eighth Circuit stated it agreed with the Montana
Supreme Court opinion, that principles of comity should be accorded great
deference. 2 0 1 Therefore, the Eighth Circuit concluded the convictions could
be used.20 2
It is interesting to note, that Judge Bye (dissenting) found the Supreme
Court does not condone using an uncounseled conviction to support guilt
for another offense.20 3 Judge Bye distinguished Lewis from Cavanaugh
because § 117 "is clearly aimed at recidivist criminal behavior where prior
offenses are necessary and integral elements of a subsequent federal
offense."2 04 According to Judge Bye, Mendoza-Lopez would control
because the earlier uncounseled convictions were essential to a claim under
§ 117 and thus, under Mendoza-Lopez, they could not be relied upon in
making the case. 2 05 Furthermore, Judge Bye found Ant persuasive because
197. Id at 604.
19 8. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 595.
201. Id. at 605; see also State v. Spotted Eagle, 71 P.3d 1239, 1245-46 (Mont. 2003)
(holding that Spotted Eagle's prior convictions for drunk driving in tribal court were valid at
their inception under the ICRA and that due to comity, ICRA, and "deference to tribal
sovereignty," the prior convictions could be used to enhance the state DUI to a felony).
202. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 605.
203. Id. at 607 (Bye, J., dissenting).
204. Id.
205. Id. (citing United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 833 (1987)).
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it was crucial that the uncounseled conviction was used to prove an element
of the subsequent federal offense.206
Despite the exhaustive Sixth Amendment analysis, the Eighth Circuit
concluded Cavanaugh's prior convictions involved no constitutional
violations because they were entered in tribal court where appointed
counsel is not mandated.207 Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit did not "believe
[it was] free to preclude use of the prior conviction merely because it would
have been invalid had it arisen from a state or federal court." 20 8 The court
specifically held "in the absence of any other allegations of irregularities or
claims of actual innocence surrounding the prior conviction," the prior
conviction may be used in subsequent proceedings in the "absence of an
actual constitutional violation.",2 09 It would appear if Cavanaugh had made
claims of actual innocence or irregularities in the tribal court proceedings,
the Eighth Circuit might have been willing to give greater weight to the
absence of the Sixth Amendment protection and perhaps deny use of the
210
convictions.
Thus, while the Ant court would not allow the uncounseled tribal court
conviction because it would have been invalid if entered in a federal or state
court, the Cavanaugh court allowed the earlier convictions because there
was no actual constitutional violation. The Tenth Circuit in Shavanaux
follows a similar path of reasoning as the Cavanaugh court, but does not
engage in any analysis of the Sixth Amendment because, in its opinion, it is
a moot point.
C. United States v. Shavanaux: The Sixth Amendment Does Not Apply to
Tribal Courts, So There Was No Violation in the First Instance
Shavanaux, a Ute Tribe member, was charged, like Cavanaugh, under
the habitual offender statute for domestic assault. 211 He had already been
212
convicted in tribal court twice for assaulting his domestic partner.22 In his
prior two convictions, Shavanaux had a lay advocate present in court but he
206. Id.
207. Id. at 603-04 (majority opinion).
208. Id. at 604.
209. Id. at 605.
210. See id The Eighth Circuit also dismissed Cavanaugh's equal protection claim
because distinctions based on tribal affiliations are not race based, and he did not fully argue
his equal protection claim, giving the court no opportunity to fully analyze the issue. See id.
at 605-06.
211. United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 995 (10th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.
Ct. 1742 (2012).
212. Id. at 996.
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did not have the benefit of legal counsel.213 In district court, Shavanaux
moved to dismiss the charge, arguing the Sixth Amendment and Due
Process Clause did not allow the use of his two prior uncounseled tribal
convictions to meet the habitual offender statute requirements.214 The
district judge, relying heavily on the district court's analysis in Cavanaugh,
found that although the uncounseled convictions did not violate the ICRA
or the United States Constitution, the use of those convictions in the
habitual offender statue would violate the Sixth Amendment.215
The issue before the Tenth Circuit was whether the use of the tribal
convictions in a subsequent habitual offender prosecution would violate the
Sixth Amendment.216 As in Ant, the Tenth Circuit began its analysis with an
examination of tribal independence.2 17 Citing Talton, the court found the
Sixth Amendment does not apply to the tribes because they are separate,
independent political communities.2 18 The court concluded: "Because the
Bill of Rights does not constrain Indian tribes, Shavanaux's prior
uncounseled tribal convictions could not violate the Sixth Amendment." 2 19
Unlike the Eighth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit stated it was in direct
conflict with Ant, but that Ant was distinguishable because Ant overlooked
the Talton line of cases that held Indian tribes were sovereign and outside
the scope of the Bill of Rights.2 20 For that reason, the court explained,
"Ant's threshold determination - that an uncounseled tribal conviction is
constitutionally infirm" - was incorrect and the Ant court's reliance on
Burgett was wrong.221 The court reasoned, because the Bill of Rights did
not apply to the tribes, the Sixth Amendment could not be violated "anew"
because it "was never violated in the first instance." 222 The court concluded
that the use of the prior uncounseled convictions was permissible in a
habitual offender statute.223 Interestingly, since the court held the Sixth
Amendment was never violated in the first instance and thus could not be
violated anew, the court stated it likewise found the Eighth Circuit's
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Order and Memorandum Decision at 1-2, United States v. Shavanaux, No. 2:10 CR
234 TC, 2010 WL 4038839, at *1-2 (D. Utah 2010), rev'd, 647 F.3d 993 (10th Cir. 2011).
216. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 995.
217. Id. at 996-97.
218. Id. (citing Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384, 386 (1896)).
219. Id. at 997.
220. Id. at 997-98.
221. Id. at 998.
222. Id.
223. See id.
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analysis of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on use of uncounseled
convictions "unnecessary."224 The Tenth Circuit concluded its Sixth
Amendment analysis, reiterating:
[B]ecause the Bill of Rights does not apply to Indian tribes,
tribal convictions cannot violate the Sixth Amendment.
Shavanux's convictions complied with ICRA's right to counsel
provision . . . . Thus, use of Shavanaux's prior convictions in a
prosecution under [the habitual offender statute] would not
violate the Sixth Amendment, anew or otherwise.225
Following Shavanaux,22 6 it is clear there is a split between the circuits about
the use of uncounseled tribal court convictions in subsequent federal
prosecutions. What is less clear, however, is which one, if any, of the circuit
courts is correct.
IV The Reliability Concerns Underlying Uncounseled Convictions Are
More Acute with Tribal Convictions, and Federal Courts Should Carefully
Consider Whether Uncounseled Tribal Convictions Should Be Allowed in
Federal Courts
Before analyzing Ant, Cavanaugh, and Shavanaux it is important to note
the areas in which the opinions are in agreement. First, all of the circuit
courts found that the Bill of Rights does not apply to the Indian Tribes, and
second, the verdicts are valid in tribal court. The circuit courts correctly
applied the Supreme Court's decision in Talton, among other cases, in
reaching the decision that the Bill of Rights does not apply, and the
convictions are valid in the tribal court.
The greatest differences between the three circuits include: (1) In
Cavanaugh and Shavanaux, the courts focused on how the failure to
appoint counsel was not an actual violation; but, Ant focused on the fact it
would have been an actual violation if first entered in federal court; and (2)
while Cavanaugh examined the reliability issue as it pertained to the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence of the Sixth Amendment, Shavanaux
completely dismissed this concern, and Ant only tangentially examined
224. Id. at 998 n.5.
225. Id. at 998 (citations omitted).
226. The Tenth Circuit also dismissed Shavanaux's due process claims holding, "tribal
convictions obtained in compliance with ICRA are necessarily compatible with due process
of law." Id. at 1000. Additionally, the Tenth Circuit dismissed the equal protection argument
because Congress had a rational basis for enacting the habitual offender statute due to the
rates of abuse of Indian women. Id. at 1002.
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reliability. The analysis of the cases will demonstrate that the real question
is whether the valid, yet uncounseled, convictions should be allowed in
federal court in light of the Supreme Court's strong jurisprudence
concerning the fundamental importance of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.
A. Valid Uncounseled Convictions May Be Used in Subsequent Trials
It is clear that uncounseled misdemeanor convictions, where the person
was not sentenced to a term of incarceration, may be used to enhance the
227penalty or as predicate elements for a subsequent offense. If there was
not actual imprisonment, then under Scott, there was not any violation of
the Sixth Amendment and the conviction may also be used to support
enhancement. 2 28 The main rationale behind allowing use of the uncounseled
convictions to enhance a sentence is the fact that the defendant is punished
for the current crime rather than for the earlier conviction(s).22 9
Additionally, any concern the court may have over reliability is tolerable
when there is no deprivation of liberty.230 Thus, following Nichols, the use
of uncounseled misdemeanor convictions in subsequent trials seems
somewhat clear.2 3 1 The Ninth Circuit, in Ant, did not have the benefit of the
twenty-plus years of jurisprudence as did the Cavanaugh and Shavanaux
courts.
The Ant court mainly based its decision to not use uncounseled pleas on
Baldasar v. Illinois.232 However, roughly five years after Ant, the Supreme
Court overturned Baldasar in Nichols.233 Thus, although the Ninth Circuit
did not know it at the time (because perhaps they should have anticipated
Baldasar would not stand, considering it was a per curiam opinion with
three separate concurrences), relying on Baldasar seriously undermined the
soundness of the Ant decision. But, there is one distinction that is important
to point out.
In Nichols, the Court allowed the use of an uncounseled misdemeanor
conviction where the defendant was not sentenced to incarceration.234 In
Ant's case, as in Cavanaugh and Shavanaux, the defendant was
227. See Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 748-49 (1994).
228. Id. at 746-47.
229. Id. at 747.
230. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 372-74 (1979).
231. See discussion supra Part ILBI.
232. See generally United States v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389, 1393-96 (1989).
233. Nichols, 511 U.S. at 748-49.
234. Id. at 749.
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incarcerated in tribal jail. Thus, it begs the question: Is the Ninth Circuit's
ruling still valid, even though based on Baldasar, because Ant was
incarcerated? The answer would appear to be no.
As the Tenth Circuit points out in Lonjose, the key inquiry in Nichols is
whether the conviction was valid at its inception.235 In Ant, Cavanaugh, and
Shavanaux the initial tribal convictions were valid; not even the Ant court
disputes their validity. Additionally, in Lonjose, the court points out some
"confusion" within the Ninth Circuit on whether valid uncounseled
convictions may be used in subsequent trials.236 Thus, it appears the Ninth
Circuit is not in the majority in prohibiting the tribal court convictions.
Although there may be more liberal rules of admissibility during
sentencing, the Supreme Court does not appear troubled by that fact;
instead, the Court seemingly lumps both sentence enhancement and
recidivism statutes together, and does not draw any distinction between the
two with regard to the use of uncounseled, but valid, convictions.237
Furthermore, the permissibility of using uncounseled tribal court
convictions becomes even stronger when coupled with the fact that the
Sixth Amendment does not apply to the tribes.
B. The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel Is Not Applicable to the Tribes in
the Same Way It Is Applicable to the States or the Federal Government
Both Cavanaugh and Shavanaux base their holdings on the fact that the
convictions were valid in tribal court where, under the ICRA, there is no
requirement for the appointment of counsel when the defendant is not
sentenced to more than a year of incarceration. 2 3 8 The Ant court, on the
other hand, based its holding on the fact that the conviction would have
been unconstitutional if rendered originally in federal court.23 9
Congress extended a certain number of rights to the Indians through the
ICRA, as noted supra. Although most of those rights were mirror images
of the first ten amendments, the Sixth Amendment right to appointed
235. See United States v. Lonjose, 42 F. App'x 177, 181 (10th Cir. 2002).
236. Id. at 182 (comparing United States v. Brady, 928 F.2d 844, 854 (9th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Hookano, 957 F.2d 714, 716 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Devine, No.
95-30014, 1996 WL 5339, at *1 (9th Cir. Jan. 5, 1996), with United States v. Smith, No. 93-
30435, 1994 WL 424659, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 1994); United States v. Early, No. 94-
10543, 1996 WL 337206, at *2 (9th Cir. June 18, 1996)).
237. See Nichols, 511 U.S. at 746-48.
238. United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 604-05 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132
S. Ct. 1542 (2012); United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 998 (10th Cir. 2011), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1742 (2012); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302(a)(6) (2006).
239. United States v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389, 1396 (9th Cir. 1989).
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counsel in cases where the person was going to be sentenced to
incarceration was curtailed.240
The Ant court relied on Burgett, which reasoned that the use of
uncounseled tribal conviction would violate "anew" the Sixth
Amendment.24 1 It is important to note Burgett dealt with the use of
uncounseled state court convictions and as the Supreme Court noted the
"right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment was applicable to the
States by virtue of the Fourteenth [Amendment] .... 242 As the court in
Cavanaugh ultimately concluded,243 and the Shavanaux court stated, "[u]se
of tribal convictions in a subsequent prosecution cannot violate 'anew' the
Sixth Amendment because the Sixth Amendment was never violated in the
first instance." 2" Although it may appear simplistic, and simplicity may be
confused with lack of foundation, it would be impossible to say Ant,
Cavanaugh, or Shavanaux's Sixth Amendment rights were violated by the
use of the uncounseled tribal court convictions. The reason there was no
violation was because the Sixth Amendment does not apply to the tribes
and thus was never violated in the first place.
As was noted supra, the Sixth Amendment does not apply in tribal courts
the same way it does in federal or state court. The ICRA extended the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel only so far as to require the tribal courts to
accept the attorney hired by the defendant, but the ICRA does not require
the tribal courts to appoint an attorney for the defendant if they cannot
afford one.245
Therefore, the fact remains that the convictions were valid in the first
instance. The Cavanaugh and Shavanaux courts rested their decision on this
fact.24 6 This analysis, however, was rather bare. A fuller analysis would
have examined whether these convictions obtained without the "guiding
hand of counsel," 247 although valid in tribal court, were reliable enough to
be used in federal court without eroding the principle of Gideon.2 48
240. 25 U.S.C. § 1032(a)(6).
241. Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109,115 (1967); Ant, 882 F.2d at 1393.
242. Burgett, 389 U.S. at 114 (emphasis added).
243. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 603-04.
244. United States v. Shavanux, 647 F.3d 993, 998 (10th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).
245. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(6).
246. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 603-04; Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 999-1000.
247. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
248. See Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967).
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C. Valid Tribal Court Convictions May Not Be Reliable Enough for Use in
Federal Court
The concern in allowing uncounseled convictions is reliability, because
the defendants did not have the experience or education to adequately
represent themselves.249 In Gideon, the Court was concerned that a person
"who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless
counsel is provided for him."2 50 In Argersinger the Court commented,
"[a]ssistance of counsel is often a requisite to the very existence of a fair
trial."2 5 1 In essence, a trial is reliable when it is fair, and a trial is fair when
the defendant has counsel to guide him through the process.
In fact, the "key Sixth Amendment inquiry [is] whether the adjudication
of guilt . . . is sufficiently reliable to permit incarceration." 5 2 Neither Ant,
nor Cavanaugh, nor Shavanaux were afforded the protection that counsel
would have provided.253 They were brought before the local tribal judge,
tried, and sentenced.2 54 But, "[c]ounsel is needed so that the accused may
know precisely what he is doing, so that he is fully aware of the prospect of
going to jail or prison, and so that he is treated fairly by the prosecution."25
It is possible, although not reflected in the record, that none of the
defendants in these cases had any idea that the conviction they received
could eventually be used against them outside of the tribal justice system
and result in a much larger sentence than they would receive in tribal court.
Therefore, the issue once again is with the reliability of the tribal
convictions.
Beyond the technical importance of counsel, the capacity of the tribal
court system is instructive in examining the reliability of their convictions.
In fiscal year 2010, the 184 tribes with court systems received only $24.7
249. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639 n.20 (1965) ("In Gideon v.
Wainwright ... we recognized a fundamental fact that a layman, no matter how intelligent,
could not possibly further his claims of innocence and violation of previously declared rights
adequately. Because of this the judgment lacked reliability.").
250. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
251. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31 (1972).
252. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 667 (2002).
253. See United States v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389, 1392 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 593-94 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1542 (2012);
United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 995-96 (10th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
1742 (2012).
254. See Ant, 882 F.2d at 1392; Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 593-93; Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at
995-96.
255. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 34.
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million in federal funding,256 whereas federal courts received $6.8 billion in
the same fiscal period.257 In light of the Court's concern in Argersinger
about the reliability of "assembly-line justice" resulting from an
overworked court system, 25 8 it stands to reason that the concerns the Court
had in Argersinger are magnified in a court system as poorly funded as the
tribal court system. Even Chief Judge Erickson of the District of North
Dakota in his opinion in Cavanaugh found tribal courts "provid[e] uneven
legal services, at best."2 59 Taken together with the reliability concerns the
Supreme Court has continuously articulated, it seems more than a little
disingenuous to hold that an uncounseled tribal court conviction does not
violate the Sixth Amendment simply because it was valid at its inception.
The tribal court decision may be valid. But validity is not equivalent to
reliability, and reliability is the true feature of any Sixth Amendment
analysis.2 60
Be that as it may, when reviewing Indian matters, federal courts have the
responsibility to respect the "special customs and practical limitations of
tribal court systems." 2 6 1 Respecting these "special customs and practical
limitations" of tribal courts does not mean federal courts are required to
accept the judgments of those courts.26 2 Thus, the question becomes
whether the convictions obtained without the "guiding hand of counsel,"
which result in incarceration, should be allowed through the United States'
constitutional filter.263
Although not fully discussed in relation to the Sixth Amendment in any
of the majority opinions, the doctrine of comity should have been examined
by the circuit courts because of the significance placed on the right to
256. Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 2012, 112th Cong.
(2011) (statement of Elbridge Coochise, Independent Review Team on Tribal Courts),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CH-RG-112hhrg66982/html/CHRG-112hhrg669
82.htm.
257. GARRETT HATCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 42008, FINANCIAL SERVICES AND
GENERAL GOVERNMENT: FY2012 APPROPRIATIONS 2 (2011).
258. See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 35-36.
259. Cavanaugh II, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1072 (D.N.D. 2009), rev'd, 643 F.3d 592 (8th
Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1542 (2012).
260. See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 667 (2002) ("We think it plain that a hearing
so timed and structured cannot compensate for the absence of trial counsel, for it does not
even address the key Sixth Amendment inquiry: whether the adjudication of guilt
corresponding to the prison sentence is sufficiently reliable to permit incarceration.").
261. Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 811(1997).
262. Id.
263. See supra text accompanying note 247.
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counsel. 2 64 A more developed discussion of the principles of comity in
relation to the Sixth Amendment would have served to better anchor the
holdings in each of the cases. Comity provides a framework to decide
whether the convictions should be allowed through our constitutional filter.
D. Comity Provides a Strong Analytical Framework to Decide Whether
Uncounseled Tribal Court Convictions Should Be Allowed in the United
States Judicial System
In his dissent, Judge Bye wrote, "[t]he district court correctly observed,
'[t]he issue before the Court is not to question the validity of the tribal court
proceedings or question the tribal justice system, but instead to evaluate
whether the convictions satisfy the constitutional requirements for use in a
federal prosecution in federal court."' 2 65 Comity provides only one avenue
for this examination.
In the three principal cases in this Note, there is no question about the
impartiality of the tribes or of proper jurisdiction - the usual reasons to not
extend comity to a foreign judgment. The decision not to extend comity to a
foreign judgment may also be based on public policy, 26 6 and the inability of
a defendant to obtain counsel is a policy reason not to extend comity.2 67 The
United States, however, "should deny recognition based on internal public
policy only where a violation is so severe as to interfere with the ability of
the country to maintain its legal culture."268
The importance of the right to counsel as an overriding factor is an
integral part of our "legal culture," and thus a reason not to allow the tribal
court convictions, as directly discussed by Ant.26 9 A more developed
discussion of the importance of the right to counsel by all the circuit courts
might have led to a conclusion that the right to counsel is an incredibly
essential right in our system of justice. To allow a judgment entered in
264. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-45 (1963).
265. United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 607 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.
Ct. 1542 (2012) (Bye, J., dissenting) (quoting Cavanaugh II, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1075
(D.N.D. 2009)).
266. See Vest, supra note 112, at 804.
267. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 482 (1987). Interestingly, the
Shavanaux court somewhat examines comity in its discussion of due process, but rejects any
argument to not recognize the judgment on that ground because Shavanaux's conviction did
not violate either of the Restatement's two mandatory factors. The court never considers the
public policy exception. United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 999 (10th Cir. 2011),
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1742 (2012).
268. See Vest, supra note 112, at 820.
269. See United States v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389, 1393-94 (1989).
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federal court without counsel to go forward would contravene the public
policy of the United States.
To support the decision not to allow the uncounseled convictions or
pleas, the courts need only look to the Supreme Court's jurisprudence of the
Sixth Amendment. For example, in Johnson v. Zerbst the Supreme Court
explained that the assistance of counsel "is one of the safeguards of the
Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to insure fundamental human rights of
life and liberty .... The Sixth Amendment stands as a constant admonition
that if the constitutional safeguards it provides be lost, justice will not 'still
be done."' 27 0 Additionally and perhaps most persuasive, is the Court's
admission:
The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be
deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some
countries, but it is in ours. From the very beginning, our state
and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on
procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair
trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands
equal before the law.271
Consequently, the question really is whether the courts should allow the
uncounseled convictions from tribal courts to be used in subsequent
prosecutions, even though they may be valid at their inception. As this Note
has demonstrated, the Supreme Court has long held that the assistance of
counsel is fundamental to our justice system and convictions obtained
without the presence of counsel or a valid waiver of counsel should be
viewed with suspicion.27 2 Thus, uncounseled tribal convictions must not be
allowed in subsequent federal cases.
Additional support for the importance of the assistance of counsel can be
found in the prevalence of the right to counsel throughout the United States.
As of 2009, "forty-six states provide counsel in all, or virtually all, criminal
cases." 273 In fact, many of the states provide more protection than the
United States Constitution demands.274
270. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,462 (1938) (emphasis added).
271. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
272. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
273. See Paul Marcus, Why the United States Supreme Court Got Some (But Not a Lot) of
the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel Analysis Right, 21 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 142, 164
(2009).
274. Id. at 149-151, 150 n.68 (citing state statutes from California, New York, North
Carolina, Vermont, and Idaho all which give broader right to counsel protections).
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Furthermore, recognizing the importance of the constitutional right to
counsel, and thereby denying recognition to foreign judgments obtained
without the protection of that right, is in line with current trends. For
example, in 2010, the Securing the Protection of our Enduring and
Established Constitutional Heritage Act (SPEECH Act) was signed into
law.275 The act prohibits state and federal courts from enforcing foreign
judgments for defamation unless they are consistent with the United States
Constitution and other federal laws.276 With the passage of the SPEECH
Act, Congress signaled the importance of the First Amendment in
American life.277
Taking into account the strong emphasis the Court places on the right to
counsel as fundamental to life and liberty, the reliability concerns
associated with uncounseled convictions generally, and the specific
concerns related to uncounseled tribal convictions' reliability, the right to
counsel seems particularly proper for the invocation of the public policy
exception to the doctrine of comity.
Finally, invocation of comity would not be disparaging to the tribal
278 aa h
courts. Instead, as the Eighth Circuit explains, "[p]recluding the use of an
uncounseled tribal conviction in federal court would in no matter restrict a
tribe's own use of that conviction; it would simply restrict a federal court's
ability to impose additional punishment at a later date in reliance on that
earlier conviction." 27 9 Furthermore, as the Ant court points out, the courts
utilizing the comity approach would not be reviewing the tribal court
proceedings and the validity of the conviction in tribal court. The courts
would only be holding the convictions did not meet the standards of the
United States Constitution for use in a subsequent trial.28 0 Ergo, not
allowing the uncounseled convictions into federal court would not be
disparaging to the tribal courts nor impose on the tribes additional burdens
they may not have the capacity to handle.
275. 28 U.S.C. §§ 4101-4105 (Supp. IV 2010); EMILY C. BARBOUR, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R 41417, THE SPEECH ACT: THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO "LIBEL TOURISM" Summary
(2010).
276. BARBOUR, supra note 275, at summary.
277. Id. at 14.
278. See United States v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389, 1395-96 (9th Cir. 1989); State v. Spotted
Eagle, 71 P.3d 1239, 1245 (Mont. 2003).
279. United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 605 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.
Ct. 1542 (2012).
280. Ant, 882 F.2d at 1396.
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V Conclusion
The Eighth and Tenth Circuits' decisions seem to comport with the letter
of the law in that a conviction valid at its inception can be used in a
subsequent trial, and the Ninth Circuit's holding seems anachronistic in
light of the Supreme Court's evolving Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.
However, the Eighth and Tenth Circuits completely overlook the
importance of the right to counsel in our system of justice, preferring
instead to rely on the technical validity of the conviction at the expense of
the reliability of the conviction.28' Never fully addressing the reliability
concerns inherent in an uncounseled conviction, the Ninth Circuit withheld
the use of the conviction because if originally entered in United States
courts, it would have been invalid.282
In light of the Supreme Court's traditional concern for reliability, a better
question to ask is whether, even though valid, the tribal convictions are
sufficiently reliable for use in subsequent federal trials and should be
allowed through our constitutional filter.283 In light of the importance of the
right to counsel and reliability of convictions, by using the doctrine of
comity, courts would be more than justified in denying the admission of
tribal court judgments in subsequent federal trials on public policy grounds.
After all, allowing the use of uncounseled convictions in subsequent trials is
a "classic example of how a rule eroding the procedural rights of a criminal
defendant on trial for his life or liberty can assume avalanche proportions,
burying beneath it the integrity of the fact-finding process."2 84
Some may argue, as important as the right to counsel may be considered
by the courts, perhaps deciding whether to extend federal recognition to
tribal convictions obtained without counsel is a task best left to Congress.
After all, Congress passed the ICRA, without extending the necessary
281. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 603-04; United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 998
(10th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1742 (2012).
282. Ant, 882 F.2d at 1394.
283. Although the main scope of this paper is about whether uncounseled tribal court
convictions should be allowed in subsequent federal trials, an equally important and related
point concerns the possible "silver platter" cooperation between the tribal police, tribal court
systems, and federal law enforcement. There is no current indication that tribal law
enforcement cooperates with federal authorities by getting a quick conviction in tribal
court - without the benefit of counsel - and then delivering the tribal conviction to the
federal authorities on a silver platter to utilize under the habitual offender statutes, which
carry significantly more jail time. The failure to provide the assistance of counsel protection
in tribal court enables this silver platter cooperation. For an example of cooperation between
state and federal authorities, see Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
284. Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 117 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring).
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appointment of counsel for indigent defendants in tribal courts because
tribal courts did not have the necessary capacity. On the other hand,
Congress has recently extended the ability of tribal courts to impose longer
sentences, provided defendants who cannot afford counsel are appointed
counsel. Thus, perhaps the tribal courts now have the necessary capacity,
and it is time to make sure the right to counsel is extended in all cases in
which a defendant is incarcerated.
As long as federal prosecutors continue to utilize the habitual offender
statutes, the courts will have to decide whether to place more importance on
technical validity or reliable validity. In any event, the courts should not
forget the importance of the right to counsel and the liberty interests it
protects. Using comity to filter out uncounseled tribal court convictions that
resulted in incarceration would not disparage the tribal courts. Instead, it
will simply underline the importance of the right to counsel in the United
States and not further "erode the principle of [Gideon]."a
285. Id. at 115 (majority opinion).
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